Federal Reserve\u27s Views on BCCI by Corrigan, E. Gerald et al.
E. GERALD CORRIGAN*
J. VIRGIL MATrINGLY, JR.**
WILLIAM TAYLOR***
The Federal Reserve's Views on BCCIt
We are pleased to appear before the Committee to describe the Federal Re-
serve's role in the supervision of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International
(BCCI) and the Federal Reserve's investigation of BCCI's secret acquisition of
the shares of several U.S. banking organizations.
This testimony will focus first on the operations of BCCI around the world,
particularly BCCI's use of a fragmented, unsupervised structure operating in
foreign jurisdictions with minimal supervision and strong bank secrecy laws;
second, on the Federal Reserve's efforts to deny BCCI entry into this country;
third, on the Federal Reserve's continuing investigation, which has detected and
produced hard evidence of BCCI's secret acquisition of the stock of U.S. banks;
and finally, on the very valuable lessons learned from the Federal Reserve's
experience with BCCI.
In considering these matters, we believe that five major points should be
stressed.
First, the Federal Reserve has never approved any presence by BCCI in this
country, and for that reason BCCI has never been authorized to take deposits
from U.S. citizens through an insured bank. Our investigation indicates that
BCCI was aware that the Federal Reserve presented a serious obstacle to acqui-
sition of banks in this country-a fact that may well explain BCCI's campaign
to acquire illegally and surreptitiously the shares of U.S. banking organizations
through a complex web of nominees and sham loan arrangements.
Second, in 1987 and 1988, the Federal Reserve detected money laundering
and operational problems at the state-licensed agencies BCCI established in this
country. Through the action of the Federal Reserve and state regulators, BCCI's
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U.S. agencies were eliminated or substantially wound down over the next three
years. By the time of BCCI's seizure on July 5, 1991, BCCI's U.S. operations
had shrunk from about $1 billion to $250 million, and BCCI's two remaining
U.S. agencies had less than $25 million in liabilities to third parties. Thus, at the
time of BCCI's closing, the vast majority of funds at its two remaining U.S.
agencies were its own. This sets the United States apart from numerous other
countries in which local depositors have lost their funds, or access to their funds,
as a result of the seizure of BCCI.
Third, the Federal Reserve did act to prevent an illegal BCCI presence in this
country when Middle Eastern investors applied in 1978 and 1980 to acquire
Financial General Bankshares, now renamed First American Bankshares. In
considering the application in 1980, the Board sought to make certain that BCCI
did not have a stake in the holding company formed to make the acquisition,
Credit and Commerce American Holdings, N.V. (CCAH), and was not funding
the acquisition.
Although the Federal Reserve did not have at that time any evidence of fraud
or illegality in BCCI's overseas banking operations, the Federal Reserve never-
theless was concerned by BCCI's unregulated character and rapid growth. Con-
cerned also because BCCI was acting as adviser to the investors, the Federal
Reserve sought to ensure that BCCI would not gain control of First American.
The Federal Reserve received explicit commitments from BCCI, the investors,
and their representatives that the acquisition of First American was being made
with the investors' own funds and that BCCI would not acquire any CCAH
shares or finance the investors. The Federal Reserve did not accept these repre-
sentations without question, but made substantial efforts to verify what it was
being told.
The Federal Reserve requested and received from the investors financial state-
ments and other documentation confirming the various representations. The nu-
merous materials submitted by the banks and accounting firms of the principal
shareholders indicated that the investors were persons of substantial wealth fully
able to make the investment using their own funds and without borrowing from
BCCI or anyone else. Even today, it is undisputed that some of the principal
investors are persons of great wealth. Further, the Federal Reserve conducted
background investigations of the investors: the Departments of State and Com-
merce stated that the investors were persons of substance and, along with the
CIA, reported no adverse information on the investors. Finally, the Federal
Reserve took the unusual step of holding a hearing on the application at which
the largest investor, three other investors, and the investors' representatives
appeared and further denied any BCCI involvement in the investment or its
financing.
Throughout this process, there was no evidence that the shareholders and their
representatives were being untruthful in their written and oral statements that
BCCI was not involved in the financing of the acquisition. Under the Bank
VOL. 26, NO. 4
FEDERAL RESERVE'S VIEWS ON BCCI 965
Holding Company Act with its due process requirements, the Federal Reserve is
not authorized to act on suspicion or rumor, but must have evidence to support
its decision. The Federal Reserve had no grounds at the time to deny and,
operating under this statutory standard, approved the application. The necessary
state authorities approved as well.
Fourth, since allegations of an illegal BCCI-CCAH link reached the Federal
Reserve in late 1988 from the IRS and another source, the Federal Reserve has
continuously investigated the relationship between the two, detecting and pro-
ducing, in our view, substantial evidence of violations by BCCI and others of the
Bank Holding Company Act and other statutes.
In January 1989, following receipt of these allegations, the Federal Reserve
conducted a special review of CCAH and its relationship to BCCI, examining the
financial relationship between BCCI and the First American banks. The Federal
Reserve continued to make inquiries into any possible link through 1989 and
1990. BCCI and CCAH representatives consistently denied that such a link
existed, and the records available to the Federal Reserve at that time provided no
evidence to refute their assertions.
The Federal Reserve asked regulators in Luxembourg and the Cayman Islands,
where the principal BCCI bank subsidiaries were chartered, to verify the reports
of a BCCI-CCAH link. In 1990, the Luxembourg regulator advised that it would
investigate the matter, but was having difficulty obtaining the necessary infor-
mation. Cayman regulators stated that they had no relevant records on the matter.
The Federal Reserve also sought information from law enforcement agencies
conducting probes of BCCI. In June 1989, while the U.S. Attorney's Office in
Tampa was continuing its investigation of BCCI, a Federal Reserve official met
with attorneys from that office, offered the assistance of examiners and indicated
that the Federal Reserve wished to obtain information on the investigation when
completed. On February 7, 1990, two days after BCCI was sentenced for money
laundering, two experienced Federal Reserve counsel went to Tampa to deter-
mine from the U.S. Attorney's Office whether their investigation had unearthed
any evidence that BCCI owned or controlled CCAH. The U.S. Attorney's Office
referred Federal Reserve counsel to IRS investigators, who indicated that a report
of the findings on their investigation had been prepared. The IRS did not provide
a copy of the report, or mention any tapes made during its investigation, due to
considerations of grand jury secrecy and witness safety. The Federal Reserve
investigators were told of the existence of an informant, whose credibility the
IRS said it seriously doubted, and of another lead. In April 1990, the IRS
provided the name of the informant and arranged for him to call the Federal
Reserve. The Federal Reserve was unsuccessful in repeated attempts to contact
the informant until 1991.
In further efforts to obtain information on the alleged control by BCCI of
CCAH, the Federal Reserve, in the spring of 1990, pursued another avenue of the
investigation. In June 1990, the Federal Reserve reached an information sharing
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agreement with the New York County District Attorney's Office, and subse-
quently obtained access pursuant to a New York Supreme Court order to certain
of the materials presented to a state grand jury investigating BCCI. This agree-
ment and the information sharing and ongoing collaboration of the Federal Re-
serve and D.A.'s Office were to be of great benefit to both agencies in uncovering
evidence of what Mr. Morgenthau, the New York County District Attorney, has
characterized as the largest banking fraud in history.
In the fall of 1990, the Federal Reserve, acting on information provided to us
by the New York County D.A., demanded and-after initial refusals by BCCI's
auditors, Price Waterhouse-was able to review at BCCI's London offices a
report confirming the existence of over $1 billion in nonperforming loans by
BCCI secured by CCAH shares. Based on the evidence gathered by Federal
Reserve investigators, the Board, on January 4, 1991, formalized and broadened
the investigation, authorizing use of discovery and subpoena powers. Later that
month, the Federal Reserve initiated examinations of the entire First American
banking organization, focused on determining whether there were any financial
dealings with BCCI.
The Federal Reserve's investigation has been intense and thorough, encom-
passing seizure and review of tens of thousands of pages of documents both here
and abroad, weeks of depositions, interviews of more than fifty different persons
in the United States and overseas, and cooperation with federal, state and foreign
law enforcement agencies. The evidence unearthed by our staff establishes the
nature and extent of numerous violations of law, the methods by which the
violations were engineered and implemented, and the nature and whereabouts of
the evidence establishing the violations.
The quality and quantity of evidence uncovered by the Federal Reserve's
investigation is evident from our 110-page July 29 Notice of Charges and the
boxes of relevant documents turned over to the Committee under its subpoena.
In that Notice and one other issued on July 12 relating to Independence Bank, the
Federal Reserve has assessed a civil money penalty of $200 million against BCCI
and initiated actions to bar nine individuals associated with BCCI from involve-
ment with U.S. banks. At the request of the U.S. Attorney for the District of
Columbia, the Board has deferred temporarily the assessment of substantial civil
money penalties against the individuals involved pending completion of the U.S.
Attorney's criminal inquiry. Finally, after discussions with the Federal Reserve,
First American and its parent holding companies have recently changed man-
agement in order to further distance the First American banks from the taint of
any association with BCCI.
Fifth, in assessing the BCCI matter, it is important to keep in mind that this
is essentially a case of systematic and deliberate criminal fraud. Although our
bank examination powers allowed the Federal Reserve to detect poor operating
controls as well as evidence of money laundering at BCCI's U.S. agencies, more
extensive and intense efforts were required to uncover BCCI's ownership of
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stock in U.S. banking organizations. BCCI took maximum advantage of an
unsupervised cooperate structure to conceal and warehouse in bank secrecy
jurisdictions billions of dollars in fraudulent transactions.
The Federal Reserve does not have the power to coerce truthful testimony from
uncooperative criminal conspirators. Nor can the Federal Reserve offer immunity
to those willing to come forward. Using the authorities available to it, the Federal
Reserve continued to investigate the matter both here and abroad, and we now
know that BCCI's top management was seriously concerned with the supervisory
initiatives of the Federal Reserve. Eventually our efforts paid off, and we un-
covered the truth. Once the Federal Reserve obtained credible evidence, we acted
quickly to marshal the facts and move against BCCI and others involved in the
alleged illegal activity. We have also taken care, in accordance with the due
process requirements under which we operate, to bring actions only when we
have sufficient evidence to support them, thereby avoiding any misstep at this
stage that might allow BCCI and others to escape the consequences of their
actions.
The Federal Reserve recognizes that one of the best ways to deter the kind of
fraud that occurred at BCCI is through criminal punishment that sends a loud and
clear message to would-be offenders. Throughout the Federal Reserve's inves-
tigation of BCCI, we have made criminal referrals whenever we discovered
illegal activity, and have provided to criminal investigators the evidence and
investigative leads that we have gathered, as well as our hard-won knowledge
and expertise regarding the BCCI case. We believe that this will be vital to any
prosecution of BCCI and others involved in BCCI's illegal acquisitions of U.S.
banks. We are greatly encouraged that the New York County District Attorney's
Office has secured indictments against BCCI and two of its senior officers, and
that the Tampa U.S. Attorney's Office has indicted senior BCCI officers for
racketeering involving money laundering. We are continuing to work with the
U.S. Department of Justice and New York County D.A., who are actively
pursuing the BCCI fraud.
I. Bank of Credit and Commerce International
A. SmucruRE oF BCCI
BCCI was founded in 1972 and until recently operated principally under the
leadership and management of individuals from Pakistan. Initial equity financing
of BCCI was provided by Middle Eastern investors and Bank of America. Bank
of America sold its ownership interest in 1980. In April 1990, in order to bolster
BCCI's sagging financial position, the ruling family and the government of Abu
Dhabi provided additional capital that increased their ownership interest in BCCI
shares from about 30 percent to 77 percent.
BCCI's operations eventually encompassed subsidiaries, branches, and affili-
ates in sixty-nine countries, with the largest concentration of local deposits in the
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United Kingdom. BCCI's total assets of about $20 billion ranked it as about the
200th largest bank in the world, roughly the size of a major regional bank in this
country.
At the apex of the BCCI organization was the parent holding company, BCCI
Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A., which was chartered and headquartered in Lux-
embourg. Below the parent were two principal banking subsidiaries: Bank of
Credit and Commerce International S.A., and Bank of Credit and Commerce
International (Overseas) Limited, which were chartered in Luxembourg and the
Cayman Islands, respectively. Although BCCI was headquartered in Luxem-
bourg, Luxembourg authorities did not supervise BCCI on a consolidated basis,
thereby allowing BCCI to escape normal banking oversight.
Under Luxembourg law, holding companies are not subject to supervision.
Thus, BCCI's holding company was able to establish an elaborate and extensive
network of subsidiaries and affiliates to carry out its activities. Our investigation
indicates that when BCCI encountered a legal impediment, it would often create
another affiliate or use one of its myriad existing or affiliated entities to circum-
vent it. In one instance, BCCI apparently created an affiliate whose sole purpose
was to serve as BCCI's alter ego in warehousing fraudulent transactions in which
BCCI could not safely engage directly. BCCI was able to do this in substantial
part because there was no consolidated home country supervision of its banking
activities.
In this regard, it is instructive that during the late 1960s, when U.S. banks
began to form holding companies to engage in activities that the bank was not
permitted to conduct directly, Congress responded with amendments to the Bank
Holding Company Act that provided for increased supervision, regulation and
examination of U.S. bank holding companies to ensure that the companies were
financially responsible and that their activities were consistent with federal
banking laws. No such system was in place with respect to BCCI's holding
company.
B. SUPERVISION OF BCCI's OPERATIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES
As noted, BCCI has never been permitted to operate a branch in the United
States or to accept deposits from the general public; nor was it authorized to
operate or control an insured bank. BCCI at one time maintained state-licensed
agencies in New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Miami, Tampa, and Boca
Raton and representative offices in other U.S. cities, including Washington,
D.C., and Houston, Texas. Representative offices can be established simply by
obtaining the consent of the state and registering with the Treasury Department,
but such offices are severely limited in their activities and may not accept de-
posits. Agencies may hold credit balances from customers associated with in-
ternational banking transactions but may not accept deposits from U.S. residents.
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As we will discuss later, the unrestricted ability of foreign banks to establish
branches, agencies and representative offices without federal review has prompted
legislative proposals by the Federal Reserve that would require federal approval
of, and establish prudential standards for, foreign bank offices in the United States.
Under current law governing foreign bank operations in the United States,
established in the International Banking Act of 1978, the states are the primary
regulators of the branches and agencies they license, and the Federal Reserve is
directed under the Bank Holding Company Act to rely on state reports of ex-
amination insofar as possible, just as the Federal Reserve is directed to rely on
reports by the comptroller of the Currency for national banks and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) for nonmember banks. BCCI's agencies
in the United States were licensed and supervised by state authorities, and there-
fore primary supervision was in the respective states. As the residual supervisor
of U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks, the Federal Reserve participated
in some state examinations and conducted some examinations of its own. During
one of these examinations of the Miami agency of BCCI, in April 1987, the
Federal Reserve identified money laundering activities, and a criminal referral
was filed with the Internal Revenue Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
and the U.S. Attorney in Miami.
On October 8-9, 1988, as a result of an undercover operation by Customs and
IRS dating back to 1986 (Operation C-Chase), BCCI and several of its U.S.
employees were indicted for money laundering through BCCI's Tampa office.
The IRS had advised Federal Reserve staff in September 1988 of the projected
seizure and the Federal Reserve had, in coordination with the IRS, scheduled an
examination to commence after the seizure so as not to compromise the IRS
operation. On October 11, the Federal Reserve, with cooperation from state
banking authorities, commenced the coordinated examination of all of BCCI's
U.S. agencies through the New York, Atlanta, and San Francisco Reserve banks.
The examinations of the New York and Boca Raton offices revealed other money
laundering activities, and the Federal Reserve made additional criminal referrals
in October and November of 1988.
The examinations also revealed that internal controls and lending practices of
the BCCI agencies were quite poor and that remedial action was required. The
Federal Reserve issued a cease and desist order against BCCI on June 12, 1989,
designed to strengthen the U.S. banking operations of BCCI and enforce com-
pliance with currency reporting requirements. This order was issued by the
Federal Reserve notwithstanding concerns expressed by foreign and state bank
regulators over the potential effect of the action.
Moreover, the U.S. Attorney in Tampa incorporated this cease and desist order
into the plea agreement reached with BCCI regarding its illegal money launder-
ing activities. Thus, compliance with the Federal Reserve's order was made a
condition of BCCI's probation. This was a unique arrangement, which enhanced
the Federal Reserve's ability to enforce its corrective cease and desist order.
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The indictment for money laundering in the United States further weakened
BCCI's already fragile reputation in the world financial community. In the period
following the indictment, Federal Reserve staff was advised that BCCI was
experiencing some outflow of deposits in London and was encountering diffi-
culty in finding counterparties for its banking transactions. In these circum-
stances and in the face of large losses being discovered in the bank in early 1990,
the government and ruling family of Abu Dhabi provided new capital of nearly
$400 million to BCCI, increasing their ownership of BCCI from 30 percent to
about 77 percent.
BCCI's problems, however, continued to worsen significantly. On October 3,
1990, Price Waterhouse delivered a secret report to BCCI's board of directors
that identified massive additional problem loans. This report gave rise to an
intensification of discussions among BCCI management, BCCI's principal share-
holder, and European banking authorities concerning possible approaches to a
broad-based restructuring of the bank. These discussions continued into 1991.
On March 4, 1991, the board issued a second cease and desist order against
BCCI in part to address concerns about the funding of its U.S. agencies. The
order required that BCCI have sufficient liquid assets to cover liabilities in its
U.S. agencies. A corollary action by the Richmond Reserve Bank required that
First American terminate any residual business with BCCI.'
Because of actions taken by the Federal Reserve and state supervisory author-
ities, BCCI's U.S. operations had been substantially curtailed by the time of its
seizure. Four of the six agencies were closed by January 1991, and the repre-
sentative offices were closed by August 1990. Under the Federal Reserve's
March 4 order, operations at BCCI's two remaining agencies-in Los Angeles
and New York-were scaled back, and the company was also ordered to termi-
nate its activities in the United States by year-end 1991.
C. THE SEIZURE OF BCCI ON JULY 5
By early 1991, information received by the Bank of England about BCCI's
financial condition and integrity prompted the Bank of England to commission
Price Waterhouse to undertake a special audit under the provisions of British
banking law. The resulting so-called section 41 report was made available to the
Bank of England on June 22, 1991. The Bank of England's filings in British
courts indicate that the report disclosed evidence of a complex and massive fraud
at BCCI, including substantial loan and treasury account losses, misappropria-
tion of funds, unrecorded deposits, the creation and manipulation of fictitious
accounts to conceal bank losses, and concealment from regulatory authorities of
BCCI's mismanagement and true financial position.
1. The divestiture provisions and other aspects of this cease and desist order are discussed in the
next section.
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Based on this report, foreign regulatory authorities in England, Luxembourg
and elsewhere decided to seize BCCI. The Federal Reserve was informed of this
decision and in turn briefed other U.S. regulatory agencies. The Federal Reserve
dispatched senior officials to London to participate in a special unit established
at the Bank of England to coordinate global regulatory actions and to provide a
central point of supervisory information and advice. A parallel unit, focusing
particularly on payment and settlement issues, as well as activities in U.S.
banking markets more generally, was established at the Board and the New York
Reserve Bank. The primary concern of the Federal Reserve was to take all
reasonable steps to ensure that the seizure of the BCCI banks did not precipitate
serious disruptions in U.S. banking markets or in dollar-based payment and
clearing systems here or abroad.
The main seizure of BCCI occurred on July 5, 1991, with the Federal Reserve
coordinating information necessary for the closing of BCCI's remaining U.S.
agencies by state regulators in California and New York. As of July 6, govern-
ments of eighteen countries had closed or restricted the activities of BCCI op-
erations in their jurisdictions. By July 29, 1991, a total of forty-four countries
had closed BCCI offices in their respective jurisdictions.
Because of the international cooperative supervisory effort and earlier actions
by the Federal Reserve and state authorities to scale back BCCI's limited
operations in the United States, the seizure of BCCI caused virtually no adverse
effects on U.S. markets or institutions. As a result of earlier regulatory action,
BCCI was funding its business in the United States from other non-U.S. BCCI
offices and not from U.S. sources at the time BCCI's U.S. agencies were
closed by the states of California and New York. As of July 30, about $17
million of the $252 million in liabilities on the books of the U.S. agencies of
BCCI was owed to creditors not affiliated with BCCI. Because of the care and
precision with which the seizure of BCCI and its affiliates was coordinated
among U.S. and foreign authorities, there were in fact no problems of any
consequence encountered in the operation of the payments system as a result of
the seizure.
We will now proceed to discuss how BCCI, apparently frustrated in its efforts
to establish a substantial legal presence in this country, acquired illegally the
stock of U.S. banking organizations.
II. The First American Banks and
Other U.S. Institutions
Financial General-the predecessor to First American Bankshares-was one
of a handful of bank holding companies that were grandfathered under the Bank
Holding Company Act to retain ownership of banks acquired in more than one
state. In 1966, Financial General owned banks in Virginia, Maryland, Georgia,
Tennessee, New York, and the District of Columbia.
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A. INITIAL STOCK PURCHASES IN 1977-1978
On April 29, 1977, an investor group led by J. William Middendorf II ac-
quired control of Financial General. Within a few months, dissatisfaction with
his leadership developed among some of the investors, who then went in search
of a buyer for their shares. They discussed a purchase of Financial General's
shares with the chief executive officer of BCCI, Agha Hasan Abedi.
In late 1977 and early 1978, BCCI, allegedly acting for four of its clients,
began to purchase shares of Financial General. These investors eventually ac-
quired approximately 20 percent of its voting shares, but none purchased more
than 5 percent of the shares. The investors were two prominent citizens of Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait and two sons of the ruler of Abu Dhabi. In various official
filings, BCCI stated that it acted only as investment advisor to these individuals
in connection with their purchases of Financial General shares and did not itself
own, control or vote any of the shares.
When the purchases were made public, the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion filed a complaint alleging that each of the four Middle Eastern investors,
BCCI, Mr. Abedi, and certain U.S. shareholders of Financial General had ac-
quired, as a group, control of more than 5 percent of Financial General's shares
in violation of the Williams Act. The investors denied these allegations. In
March 1978, the investors, without admitting fault, entered into a consent decree
with the SEC whereby the investors agreed to proceed with a tender offer for all
of Financial General's shares.
Three of the original four investors proceeded with the tender offer, joined by
eleven additional individual and corporate investors from the Middle East who
were also advised by BCCI. The investors formed CCAH, a Netherlands Antilles
corporation, in order to make the tender offer.2
B. CCAH's APPLICATION TO ACQUIRE
FINANCIAL GENERAL: 1978-1981
CCAH could not proceed to acquire Financial General's shares without board
approval under the Bank Holding Company Act. On October 19, 1978, CCAH
filed an application seeking such approval. The application was opposed by
Financial General and its Maryland subsidiary bank. On February 16, 1979, the
Board dismissed the application, concluding that the acquisition would be un-
lawful under a Maryland law that forbade any hostile acquisition of a Maryland
bank.
2. There were two other companies in the ownership chain: Credit and Commerce American
Investment, B.V. (CCAI), a Netherlands company and a wholly owned subsidiary of CCAH; and
FGB Holding Corporation, a District of Columbia corporation and wholly owned subsidiary of
CCAI. FGB Holding Corporation was subsequently renamed First American Corporation and was the
entity that acquired Financial General Bankshares.
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The applicants challenged the Board's decision, but before the matter was
adjudicated, the investors and Financial General's management negotiated an
agreement for the acquisition of Financial General by CCAH. In November
1980, CCAH again sought Board approval to acquire Financial General.
In reviewing such an application, the Board is required by statute to consider
the competitive effects of the proposal, the financial and managerial resources
and future prospects of the companies concerned, and the convenience and needs
of the relevant communities. The statutory factors do not distinguish between
foreign and domestic acquirers, and thus these factors were applied to the CCAH
application as they would be to a domestic holding company application. Under
the Bank Holding Company Act, the Board does not have discretion to deny
applications as it chooses. Its decision must be made on the basis of the statutory
factors and must be supported by evidence.
The application specified that the Middle Eastern investors were to be passive
and would take no part in the management or operation of Financial General.
The management of Financial General was vested in a board of directors that
would include former Senator Stuart Symington, former Secretary of Defense
Clark M. Clifford, and retired Lieutenant General Elwood R. Quesada. Inves-
tors controlling over 50 percent of CCAH's shares transferred the power to vote
their shares to Senator Symington for a period of five years. An experienced
banker was to be selected as president and chief executive officer of Financial
General, and this person was identified before the Board acted on the application.
As a result of the SEC case, the Board focused great attention on the relation-
ship between CCAH and BCCI, specifically whether BCCI had a stake in the
planned acquisition, either directly or indirectly. The Board's concern was suf-
ficiently serious that the Board took the unusual step of convening a hearing on
this and other questions raised by the application, requesting that the principal
shareholders of CCAH appear and testify at the hearing.
In response to the Board's questions, CCAH and its principal shareholders
stated that BCCI would not be involved in the acquisition other than as invest-
ment advisor to the CCAH investors and, in particular, would not fund the
acquisition. At the hearing and in written submissions, CCAH shareholders and
their counsel, Clark Clifford and his partner, Robert A. Altman, of the law firm
of Clifford & Warnke, made the following statements:
* The application filed by CCAH stated: "BCCI owns no shares of FGB,
CCAH or CCAI, either directly or indirectly, nor will it if the application is
approved. Neither is it a lender, nor will it be, with respect to the acquisition
by any of the investors of either FGB, CCAI or CCAH shares."
* In a letter submitted to the Board in response to questions about the rela-
tionship between BCCI and CCAH, counsel for CCAH stated: "With re-
gard to the stockholders of CCAH, all holdings constitute personal invest-
ments. None are held as an unidentified agent for another individual or
organization."
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* Kamal Adham, the largest shareholder of CCAH, stated at the Board's
hearing, "There is . . . no understanding or arrangement regarding any
future relationship or proposed transactions between Financial General and
BCCI." He further stated, "[I]t appears that there is doubt that there is
somebody or BCCI is behind all of this deal. I would like to assure you that
each one on his own rights will not accept in any way to be a cover for
somebody else."
" CCAH counsel, when asked at the hearing about the relationship among
CCAH and CCAI and BCCI, stated, "[T]here is no connection between
those entities and BCCI in terms of ownership or other relationship."
" Asked about the function of BCCI in the proposal, CCAH counsel stated,
"None. There is no function of any kind on the part of BCCI." He added,
"I know of no present relationship. I know of no planned future relationship
that exists . .. ."
The same representations were made to the other regulators involved in the
application. The comptroller of the Currency was advised by investors' counsel
that "none of the investors are borrowing to finance their respective equity
contributions" and that "BCCI will have no involvement with the management
and other affairs of Financial General nor will BCCI be involved in the financing
arrangements, if any are required, regarding this proposal."
The Board did not rely solely on these representations that the investors were
acting for themselves. The Board requested detailed information from the inves-
tors regarding their financial resources and affiliations, including financial state-
ments prepared by accounting firms, some of which were affiliated with the
largest accounting firms in the world. Financial statements were submitted, and,
in the case of the largest shareholders, a statement about the source of funds to
be used to make the acquisition was required. The Board also obtained letters
from the largest investor's banks confirming balances and containing references.
All these materials indicated that the investors were persons of considerable
means and the purchases were to be made from their own personal resources.
To further verify that the representations being made were accurate, the Board
conducted background checks on the shareholders, soliciting information from
the Central Intelligence Agency, the Departments of State and Commerce, and a
foreign bank supervisor. The Board also obtained information from the SEC
regarding the original acquisition and two CCAH shareholders.
None of the agencies performing background checks-the CIA and State and
Commerce Departments-reported any adverse information on the investors,
and the Departments of State and Commerce reported that the investors were
persons of substance. Neither the Board nor any other regulator received any
evidence from other sources that the representations made to them were false.
The Comptroller's Office wrote to the Board stating that its earlier concerns about
the application had been addressed by the responses of the investors and their
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representatives. The Maryland Banking Board approved the acquisition of the
Maryland bank on June 25, 1981.
On August 25, 1981, after considering the hearing record, reports from staff,
and the views of federal and state agencies, the Board approved CCAH's acqui-
sition of Financial General. Consummation of the acquisition was delayed, how-
ever, pending approval of the New York State Banking Department of the ac-
quisition of Financial General's New York banks. The department initially
disapproved the application, principally because of an alleged lack of reciprocity
for American banks in the investors' home countries. However, on March 2,
1982, the department granted its approval following CCAH's commitment to
divest one of the New York banks. In a subsequent letter, the department stated
that it had made a thorough investigation, that "all the information we received
indicated that the investors were prestigious and reputable people," and that "the
investors' character and financial responsibility warranted approval of the appli-
cation." The department further noted that "this application received more
scrutiny from more regulatory agencies than any other application in recent
memory."
The acquisition was consummated on April 19, 1982. Financial General was
renamed First American in August 1982. 3 Mr. Clifford became chairman of the
board of First American, and Mr. Altman was named president of First American
Corporation and secretary and a managing director of CCAH.
C. THE PERIOD 1982-1987
In the years immediately following the acquisition, the Board received no
indications to suggest that CCAH and First American were functioning other than
in accordance with the statements made to the Board and the other regulators.
The investors adhered to their commitment to inject $12 million in new capital
into First American, and no dividends were paid to the investors in keeping with
another commitment. On several occasions, the investors made very substantial
additional capital injections, in the hundreds of millions of dollars, to support
First American's activities. Both federal and state examinations of First Amer-
ican and its subsidiary banks by the comptroller of the Currency, FDIC, and the
states of Maryland, Virginia, Tennessee, and New York, and of the U.S. offices
of BCCI conducted during this period, detected no evidence that BCCI and
CCAH were improperly linked. The fact that substantial fresh capital was sup-
plied at various times and that the investors did not take dividends from the
CCAH was consistent with the representations made by the investors at the time
of the acquisition that this was intended to be a personal investment.
3. During the course of the takeover, prior Financial General management had renamed most
of the subsidiary banks First American banks.
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D. THE MONEY LAUNDERING PERIOD: 1987-1989
As discussed previously, the Federal Reserve through its examination function
detected evidence of money laundering in 1987, and appropriate criminal refer-
rals were made. The coordinated examinations conducted following the October
1988 indictment stemming from Operation C-Chase led to further criminal re-
ferrals. It is now apparent that the publicity surrounding BCCI's illegal money
laundering activities in the United States had the understandable effect of be-
ginning to shake loose insights into other aspects of BCCI's activities and op-
erations in the United States and around the world that only recently have been
more fully understood by the international community of bank supervisory and
law enforcement officials. Insofar as the Federal Reserve was concerned, the first
indications of more widespread wrongdoing in the United States began to surface
in the period between late December 1988 and the summer of 1989.
E. FEDERAL RESERVE INVESTIGATION OF THE
BCCI-CCAH LINK: 1989-PRESENT
The information described in this section is based on recent interviews with a
number of persons involved in this matter and we are continuing in our efforts
to reconstruct the events of two-and-a-half to three years ago. Based on this
information, we know that, in early September 1988, an IRS special agent
investigating BCCI contacted a supervisory official of the Board for technical
assistance in connection with the proposed seizure of BCCI's Florida offices and
indictment for money laundering. He stated that the IRS was investigating BC-
CI's money laundering in Florida. The agent explained that this was a sensitive
undercover operation and that any leaks could jeopardize lives and compromise
the investigation.
The Board staff member had a number of follow-up conversations with the
IRS agent in late 1988 and early 1989. Probably during a telephone call in
December 1988, the agent mentioned an allegation that he had received during
the undercover operation from a "banker" that BCCI owned First American.
The Federal Reserve staff member's calendar reflects a December 27, 1988, call
from the IRS agent and that First American and the National Bank of Georgia
were mentioned. The staff member recalls that, at some point during their tele-
phone conversation, the IRS agent mentioned the allegation. According to the
agent, the Federal Reserve staff member requested the evidence, but was not
given the name of the person or other details because the information was not
then public. As noted above, during late 1988, the agent and the staff member
also discussed and agreed on the timing of the Federal Reserve's coordinated
examination of the BCCI agencies to occur after the indictment.
The agent states that, on December 27, 1988, he telephoned the Federal Re-
serve staff member, and during the conversation, which was brief, asked what
kind of information the Federal Reserve would need to order BCCI from the
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country. The staff member had told the agent earlier that BCCI was an issue for
the Federal Reserve and that, if the evidence were available, the Federal Reserve
would order BCCI out of the country. The agent states that he asked, hypothet-
ically speaking, whether a case could be made if he could provide the Federal
Reserve with the names of five or six former BCCI officials who would testify
that at an annual meeting of BCCI, a high level official stated BCCI owned and
controlled First American. The Federal Reserve staff member is reported to have
said that such statements would not be enough-that documentary evidence
would be needed. The Federal Reserve staff member recalls that the agent at
some point in their discussions mentioned a hypothetical, but does not recall that
the agent's hypothetical included mention of five or six witnesses. The IRS did
not provide the name of any witness until 1990, as discussed below.
The IRS agent indicates that on February 2, 1989, he had to travel to Wash-
ington for other purposes and decided to meet with the Federal Reserve staff
member principally for the purpose of obtaining Federal Reserve information on
BCCI and our investigation of the original CCAH application and to secure the
Federal Reserve staff member's input into the agent's thinking on the investiga-
tion. According to the agent, he was interested in historical information on BCCI
and any relationships between BCCI, the National Bank of Georgia, and First
American because of earlier information he had obtained during the undercover
operation about such relationships. There were several follow-up calls by the IRS
to arrange access to Federal Reserve information and subpoenas for examination
material. Also, in late December 1988, a Richmond Reserve Bank staff member
received a press inquiry in which the reporter referred to an affidavit for a search
warrant by an undercover agent stating that, during the undercover operation, a
BCCI employee said that BCCI controlled the National Bank of Georgia and
other banks.
A Federal Reserve investigator has subsequently interviewed this witness,
who was the source of the allegation mentioned by the IRS agent to the Federal
Reserve staff member in December 1988 and who was one of the BCCI em-
ployees indicted in October 1988 and convicted in May 1990. The witness
stated, consistent with a transcript of his conversation with the undercover agent
in September of 1988, that he has no direct evidence that BCCI owns First
American and that his statement was based on rumor within the BCCI organi-
zation. This witness produced no evidence to support the Federal Reserve's
case.
In the spring of 1989, the IRS talked to Richmond Reserve Bank staff regard-
ing information on CCAH and First American and subsequently the Tampa U.S.
Attorney's Office subpoenaed all relevant records, including Federal Reserve
examination reports and internal documents. During the spring and summer of
1989, Richmond Reserve Bank personnel met with and provided information to
the IRS regarding CCAH. The San Francisco and Atlanta Reserve Banks pro-
vided information as well.
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F. RICHMOND RESERVE BANK REvIEw: JANUARY 1989
Because of these allegations raised by the IRS and because CCAH at that time
had before the Federal Reserve an application to acquire another subsidiary bank,
the Richmond Reserve Bank undertook in January 1989 a fresh review of any
relationships between BCCI and CCAH. During a review, senior management of
CCAH and First American stated that the relationship between CCAH and BCCI
was no different than as represented to the Board in 1981 at the time of the
original application, and that BCCI did not exercise a controlling influence over
CCAH. The Richmond Reserve Bank examiner requested that Mr. Altman write
to the president of each First American bank subsidiary, requiring a report on the
relationship of the bank to BCCI and on any transactions conducted with BCCI
by the bank. This survey of presidents disclosed no unusual relationships or
transactions between the banks and BCCI. New York State authorities had also
recently completed an examination of the New York bank subsidiary, during
which the examiners focused closely on BCCI correspondent accounts and trans-
actions and detected no irregularities. Moreover, again according to the IRS
agent, the Federal Reserve staff member called him sometime in early 1989
requesting any information the IRS had on BCCI links with First American
because of a then-pending application. The agent said he told the staff member
he did not have anything, believing that the request related only to documentary
evidence.
In its report on February 8, 1989, the Richmond Reserve Bank found no ev-
idence of irregular or significant contacts between the First American banks and
BCCI, or of failure by CCAH to adhere to the commitments it made to the Board
in 1981. The Reserve Bank noted that the common ownership of CCAH and BCCI
had increased. The Bank Holding Company Act does not prohibit common own-
ership of banks or nonbanks by individuals, as it does for companies.
G. CONTINUING INVESTIGATION
During 1989 and continuing into 1990, Federal Reserve efforts to pursue
reports of a BCCI/First American link were often frustrated by our inability to
obtain the documentary or corroborating evidence necessary to initiate actions
against individuals or institutions that we now allege have violated laws and
regulations. The Federal Reserve's investigation persisted into 1991, and it was
the complex chain of information developed over this period that ultimately led
to the needed evidence and our criminal referrals and civil enforcement actions.
During this period, Federal Reserve personnel made inquiries of law enforce-
ment authorities and foreign bank supervisors seeking information. As we noted
in the introduction, on June 1, 1989, a Federal Reserve official met with the
Tampa prosecutors and stated that the Federal Reserve would be interested in the
results of their investigation and would send staff down when the investigation
was completed. The official offered the assistance of Federal Reserve examiners.
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In the summer of 1989, during the course of a meeting on another matter, a senior
official from the New York County D.A.'s Office informed a Federal Reserve
official of certain unsubstantiated reports that BCCI owned CCAH through nom-
inees. No concrete or specific information as to particulars or evidence was
provided. On February 7, 1990, two experienced Federal Reserve counsel fol-
lowed up these contacts by meeting with the U.S. Attorney's Office and IRS
investigators who were investigating BCCI and, in June 1990, by arranging an
information-sharing agreement with the New York County D.A., who was also
investigating BCCI. We have described in the introduction the information on the
BCCI/CCAH relationship that these agencies provided to the Federal Reserve
during those contacts in 1990.
Also in the fall of 1989, Federal Reserve staff inquired of and received infor-
mal advice from a Luxembourg banking supervisor that BCCI had loans out-
standing to certain CCAH shareholders. The supervisor did not know when the
loans were booked and whether they were for the purchase of CCAH stock or for
other business activities of the shareholders. Federal Reserve staff wrote to Mr.
Altman on December 13, 1989, asking for information on any loans by BCCI or
its affiliates to the original or subsequent investors in CCAH, either directly or
indirectly and regardless of the purpose of the loan. Mr. Altman forwarded the
letter to BCCI for response.
In February 1990, Mr. Altman responded with a letter stating that no pledge
or security interest had ever been recorded on CCAH's share register by any
lender. Mr. Altman did not mention the security interest BCCI had held in his and
Mr. Clifford's shares from 1986 to March 1988. Mr. Altman also attached the
response from the acting chief executive of BCCI, Mr. Naqvi, stating that BCCI
had not financed the acquisition of Financial General in any respect and that none
of the CCAH shareholders had personal loans from BCCI during the acquisition,
secured by the CCAH shares. Mr. Adham, the principal shareholder of CCAH,
also confirmed by letter in March 1990 that his CCAH acquisition was primarily
from personal funds and was not financed by BCCI. In order to check the
statements by Mr. Naqvi, Federal Reserve staff subsequently requested the as-
sistance of the foreign bank supervisor who had originally provided information
to the Board. The supervisor responded that he had encountered difficulties in
obtaining the necessary information but would continue his investigation. An
inquiry was also made of the Cayman supervisor, who reported he had no
relevant records.
During August and September 1990, Federal Reserve investigators continued
to meet with investigators from the New York County D.A.'s Office and obtained
access to grand jury materials. In October 3, 1990, the New York County D.A.'s
Office informed us that a confidential source had stated that a report prepared on
October 3, 1990, by BCCI's outside auditors, Price Waterhouse, indicated that
BCCI had made substantial loans to CCAH shareholders, secured by CCAH
shares. The D.A.'s Office did not have the report, and Federal Reserve staff
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immediately requested access to it from the United States general manager of
BCCI. After a delay occasioned by the refusal of the auditor to permit the report
to be examined by the Federal Reserve, BCCI agreed that a member of the
Federal Reserve's supervision staff could review the report at BCCI's London
office. The review was conducted on December 10, 1990.
The auditor's report and a conversation on that date with the new chief executive
officer of BCCI indicated that BCCI had over $1 billion in loans outstanding,
secured by CCAH stock, and that these loans were nonperforming. This confirmed
that BCCI held CCAH shares as collateral for substantial loans to CCAH share-
holders. Shortly thereafter, attorneys from a U.S. law firm representing BCCI and
its Abu Dhabi shareholders contacted the Board's general counsel to request a
meeting. At a meeting on December 21, 1990, BCCI's counsel confirmed that a
substantial amount of the stock of CCAH had been pledged to BCCI as collateral
for hundreds of millions of dollars in loans to certain shareholders of CCAH.
BCCI's counsel identified the borrowing shareholders and the amount of the loans.
BCCI's counsel was advised of the seriousness of the matter under the Bank
Holding Company Act, and was asked to provide all information regarding the
loans and BCCI's arrangements with the borrowers.
Based on this and the other information uncovered during the Federal Re-
serve's investigation during 1989 and 1990, the Board, on January 4, 1991,
issued an order formalizing our ongoing investigation and authorizing the use of
subpoena powers. The Federal Reserve's investigation has been wide ranging but
directed chiefly into the circumstances of BCCI's acquisition of control of CCAH
and whether false or misleading statements had been made to the Board during
the application process in 1981 and subsequently. Thus far, the investigation has
included taking weeks of depositions, interviewing more than fifty witnesses,
and seizing and reviewing a very large number of documents, including all
CCAH records in the United States and the Netherlands Antilles and BCCI loan
and other records relating to CCAH located abroad. The investigative team spent
a week in Abu Dhabi reviewing BCCI's loan files on CCAH and conducting
numerous interviews with BCCI officers.
The Federal Reserve's investigation has uncovered evidence of extensive and
secret loan and nominee arrangements between BCCI and customers of BCCI
designed to allow BCCI to acquire, in the name of these customers, the stock of
the First American banking organization as well as other depository institutions
in the United States. These arrangements in many cases involved sham loans to
the BCCI customers with side agreements that the customers would not be
required to repay or service the loans and that BCCI could sell the shares and
retain the profits. In return for their services, the customers received fees and
indemnities. These nominee arrangements are described in detail in the Board's
civil money penalty and prohibition actions of July 12 and 29, 1991.
Many of these CCAH loans were never serviced or repaid except through other
loans from BCCI. From the evidence available, it appears that these arrange-
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ments, particularly in later years, enabled BCCI to generate hundreds of millions
of dollars in fictitious assets to conceal massive losses in its trading and lending
accounts.
Our investigation has also revealed more about how BCCI's ownership of
CCAH stock was concealed from the Federal Reserve and other investigators.
The shareholder register and other CCAH records in the United States and the
Netherlands Antilles that were subject to Federal Reserve examination or review
indicated that the individuals and companies listed in CCAH's filings with the
Federal Reserve were in fact the owners of the shares of CCAH. There was no
record of a security or other interest by BCCI in the CCAH shares. The docu-
ments that evidence the arrangements between CCAH shareholders and BCCI
were all maintained outside the United States by the most senior management of
BCCI in files that we understand were not available to the bank's auditors.
Moreover, documents reviewed during the investigation suggest that BCCI de-
liberately structured various transactions so as to conceal from the Federal Re-
serve the relationship between BCCI and CCAH. Finally, there were the numer-
ous denials by BCCI and CCAH representatives that any link existed.
H. 1991 CEASE AND DESIST ORDER REQUIRING
DIVESTITURE OF CCAH SHARES
To terminate the illegal relationship between BCCI and CCAH, the Federal
Reserve, on January 22, 1991, sent a proposed cease and desist order to counsel
for BCCI and made criminal referrals to the Department of Justice. The cease
and desist order, which was consented to by BCCI on March 4, had five
principal components: requiring BCCI to divest promptly its CCAH shares;
significantly restricting business transactions between BCCI and the First
American banks; ensuring that BCCI had sufficient liquid assets to cover
liabilities in the U.S. agencies; terminating BCCI's residual business presence
in the United States; and requiring that BCCI cooperate in the Federal Reserve's
investigation.
The order required BCCI promptly to divest its interest in CCAH through a
plan to be submitted to the Board for its approval. The order, and a similar one
on February 1, 1991, against CCAH, also prohibited transactions between BCCI
and the First American banks (other than capital injections into the banks and
certain clearing transactions in the ordinary course of business). After entry of
the CCAH order on February 1, 1991, the Federal Reserve informed the First
American Bank of New York that its clearing transactions for BCCI should be
wound down and terminated. As a result of these actions, transactions between
BCCI and the First American banks have been steadily eliminated. The relation-
ship between BCCI and the First American Bank of New York-with which
BCCI had maintained a correspondent relationship-was substantially wound
down by July 5.
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I. ADDITIONAL AcQuISITION OF U.S. DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS
The Federal Reserve's investigation continued after issuance of the March 4
order and discovered evidence that BCCI acquired interests in three additional
U.S. depository institutions. Our evidence indicates that BCCI in 1985 acted
through a nominee, Ghaith Pharaon, to acquire the Independence Bank, Encino,
California, in violation of the Bank Holding Company Act. Independence Bank
is a state nonmember bank supervised by the FDIC. The Federal Reserve's
investigation also uncovered substantial evidence indicating that BCCI, acting
through Mr. Pharaon, acquired during the 1980s a substantial interest in the
National Bank of Georgia, a bank supervised by the comptroller of the Currency.
NBG was purchased by First American in 1987 with funds the Board believes
were provided to First American by BCCI. Finally, later in the investigation, we
uncovered evidence that BCCI financed and acquired control of shares of Cen-
Trust Savings Bank, Miami, Florida, in 1988-89, again acting through or with
Pharaon.
On May 3, the Federal Reserve issued a second cease and desist order requir-
ing BCCI to submit to the Federal Reserve a plan for the divestiture of any shares
of Independence Bank within its control. A criminal referral relating to this
violation was also filed.
In conjunction with the investigation, the Federal Reserve has also taken steps
to monitor through the examination process the operations of the First American
banks, and to determine what relationship the banks have with BCCI. Exami-
nations and special reviews were undertaken by the Federal Reserve starting in
January 1991. Over fifty senior Federal Reserve examiners have for the past nine
months closely reviewed the First American banking organization, and these
efforts continue. In addition, Federal Reserve investigators are working with
other federal and state agencies to review transactions that may involve BCCI
and related persons.
J. STATUS OF DIVESTITURE ORDERS
Recent events have made the requirement that BCCI divest the shares of
CCAH and Independence Bank under its control the most difficult part of the
cease and desist order to achieve. On May 3, BCCI submitted to the Federal
Reserve a proposed divestiture plan for the CCAH shares, and on July 3, BCCI
submitted a divestiture plan for the Independence Bank shares. The CCAH plan
called for transfer of the shares of CCAH held by BCCI, and possibly shares held
by other CCAH shareholders, to a trust administered by an independent trustee
acceptable to the Federal Reserve. The trustee would vote the stock and negotiate
its sale within a time frame agreed to by the Federal Reserve. We found the trust
arrangement to be acceptable, but considered the proposal to be deficient because
it failed to set forth the timing of the sale-specifically, there were no guarantees
that the divestiture would be a prompt one, as required in the Federal Reserve's
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order. We therefore rejected BCCI's proposal by letter of May 10, and required
BCCI to submit within ten days a revised plan that addressed this concern.
On May 20, BCCI did submit a revised plan, which also relied on a trust
arrangement. Although this new plan did not contain a timetable, it did contain
details and conditions that appeared to expedite the sale. A preliminary draft of
the trust agreement was submitted by BCCI on June 6.
Implementation of BCCI's proposed divestiture plans has been delayed by the
seizure of BCCI by regulatory authorities. After those authorities seized control
of BCCI on July 5, the officers and directors of BCCI were no longer able to
negotiate or effectuate a divestiture of CCAH or Independence Bank stock on
behalf of BCCI.
In our view, the July 5 seizure order does not void the Federal Reserve's
divestiture orders, however. The orders remain effective and legally binding. The
seizure shifts the task of implementing the orders from BCCI to the receivers for
BCCI. We have been in contact with the receivers, explaining to them the need
to achieve total divestiture as soon as possible, and requesting that they submit
promptly a revised divestiture plan. The receivers have indicated a willingness to
achieve divestiture through the trust arrangements, and our discussions are con-
tinuing.
K. FEDERAL RESERVE ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS TO DATE
As part of its investigation, the Federal Reserve is proceeding with enforce-
ment actions as the evidence to support such actions is accumulated. On July 12,
the Federal Reserve issued a notice of intent to bar from U.S. banking individuals
participating in the Independence Bank violation. Those individuals are Agha
Hasan Abedi and Swaleh Naqvi, two former senior officers of BCCI; Kemal
Shoaib, a former officer of BCCI and the former chairman of Independence
Bank; and Ghaith Pharaon, the owner of record of Independence Bank and a
shareholder of BCCI.
More recently, on July 29, the Federal Reserve issued a notice of assessment
of a $200 million in civil money penalty against BCCI for its illegal acquisition
of CCAH, the National Bank of Georgia, and CenTrust Savings Bank. The
Federal Reserve also issued a notice of intent to bar permanently nine individuals
associated with BCCI from any future involvement with U.S. banking organi-
zations. On the same day, the District Attorney's Office for the County of New
York secured indictments of BCCI and Messrs. Abedi and Naqvi. As noted, the
U.S. Attorney in Tampa has also recently indicted senior officials of BCCI for
racketeering involving money laundering.
The Federal Reserve is continuing to cooperate with law enforcement agen-
cies, and will of course consult those agencies before taking enforcement action
so as to avoid prejudicing any criminal investigation. Thus, at the request of the
United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, the Federal Reserve has
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deferred temporarily the assessment of substantial civil money penalties against
the individuals already charged, pending completion of the United States Attor-
ney's criminal inquiry.
III. The Lessons of the BCCI Affair
A. DOMESTIC INITIATIVES
As a result of the BCCI matter and other recent compliance problems with
foreign banks, the Federal Reserve reviewed the statutes, regulations, and su-
pervisory policies governing foreign bank operations in the United States. To
help prevent a recurrence of such problems, the Federal Reserve has sent to
Congress proposals to control the entry of foreign banks into the United States
and strengthen the supervision and regulation of foreign banks once they have
entered. Those proposals, collected as the Foreign Bank Supervision Enhance-
ment Act of 1991, have been incorporated into comprehensive banking reform
bills that have been reported out of this Committee and its counterpart in the
Senate.
This legislation would establish uniform federal standards for entry, operation
and expansion of foreign banks in the United States. The proposed legislation
includes, importantly, requirements of consolidated home country supervision
and supervisory access to information regarding the banking organization, and
the application to foreign banks of the same financial, managerial, and opera-
tional standards that govern U.S. banks. The proposal would also grant federal
regulators the authority to terminate the U.S. presence of a foreign bank that is
engaging in illegal, unsafe, or unsound practices.
As the BCCI affair amply demonstrates, continuing consolidated supervisory
oversight of a bank's operations is essential to maintaining the integrity of the
bank's operations and preventing adverse effects on the financial system. BCCI
operated without a supervisor who could regulate and examine the consolidated
financial organization, and BCCI was therefore able to manipulate its books and
conceal its actual financial condition with minimal chance of detection.
Of course, the Federal Reserve's legislative recommendations would not guar-
antee that criminal activity by foreign banks would not recur. Fraud is extremely
difficult for any regulator to detect, especially when transactions are deliberately
and illegally structured to conceal relationships and when the relevant informa-
tion is maintained secretly outside the United States. The Federal Reserve's
proposals attempt to address the potential for illegal activities by creating a bar
to U.S. entry by weakly capitalized, poorly managed or inadequately supervised
organizations.
As a result of recent experience, the Federal Reserve is devoting more re-
sources to examining, tracking, and monitoring foreign bank operations and will
need to increase resources in this area if the legislation is enacted. In addition,
we believe that it would be useful to establish a small unit of trained investigators
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to handle cases where examination procedures and methods are not sufficient to
detect or prove the wrongdoing.
B. IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
The BCCI case also highlights the pressing need for greater international
cooperation among bank regulators.
The vehicle for improved international banking supervision is the Basle Su-
pervisors Committee, comprised of the Federal Reserve and other central banks
and bank regulators. That Committee's achievements so far have included the
adoption of the Concordat, which is the statement of fundamental principles
governing supervision of banks operating across borders, and the establishment
of international capital standards.
At its meeting in Stockholm in early September, the Committee, under the
guidance of President Corrigan, its newly elected chairman, began discussions of
the important lessons to be learned from the BCCI matter. The Committee has
commissioned, and hopes to have finished by its December meeting, an issues
paper that will consider a range of subjects stemming from the BCCI matter. These
include: (1) standardized criteria for the establishment by foreign banks of
branches or subsidiaries; (2) what steps can be taken to strengthen procedures for
the cross-border sharing of supervisory information, especially in times of stress;
(3) whether contagion problems are of such a nature as to render distinctions
between branches and subsidiaries of little utility in times of stress; (4) the re-
lationship between home country and host country supervisors as it pertains to the
supervision of branches; (5) whether consolidated supervisory responsibility
should rest in a single home country supervisor or be shared among several su-
pervisors acting as a college; and (6) whether and to what extent supervisors may
require changes in corporate structures where such structures may, by their nature,
hinder effective supervision.
One major practical issue confronts the Federal Reserve and other U.S. reg-
ulatory agencies in efforts to cooperate with foreign regulators. Whereas certain
other Western nations have statutes that protect confidential bank supervisory
information obtained from foreign regulators from release to the public or even
to the legislature, information obtained by U.S. regulators from foreign sources
does not enjoy the same confidentiality. Because as U.S. regulators we may not
assure our foreign counterparts that the information that we receive from them
will be held confidential, those governments may be less willing, or legally
unable, to share information with us fully or completely, or to do so on a regular
or timely basis. While we are sensitive to and respectful of the prerogatives of the
legislature to seek and obtain necessary information, we also believe that the
conflict between U.S. regulators' need for international cooperation, particularly
with increasing globalization of banking and the need of the Congress to access
information for its oversight and investigatory responsibilities, is a question that
merits careful consideration.
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IV. Conclusion
The Federal Reserve is actively engaged in dealing with the BCCI matter and
has deployed its most experienced and proven staff to the task. The Federal
Reserve will continue to cooperate with federal, state, and foreign bank super-
visors and law enforcement agencies. Our immediate goals are to conclude our
investigation; to make the current separation in fact between BCCI and U.S.
banks a complete separation in law, so that these banks can be relieved of any
remaining BCCI taint and operate free and clear of this controversy; and to
ensure that all wrongdoers are prosecuted civilly and criminally to the extent
permitted by law.
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